Chinese and Counterfactual Reasoning by Jiang, Yan
This is the version of the chapter accepted for publication in The Routledge handbook of 
Chinese applied linguistics / edited by Chu-Ren Huang, Zhuo Jing-Schmidt, and Barbara 
Meisterernst (ISBN: 9781138650732). 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24294
 
Chinese and Counterfactual Reasoning 
Yan JIANG 
yj9@soas.ac.uk 
Abstract: This paper begins with a scrutiny of the notion SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL together 
with an introduction to the distinction of EXTRINSIC and INTRINSIC FACTORS affecting the nature of 
logical operators. This is followed by a cursory overview of psychological and grammatical 
researches on counterfactual expressions in Mandarin Chinese. It then sets out a list of tasks to be 
accomplished and explicates the author’s view in a recent proposal that Mandarin counterfactuals 
can be formally divided into EXPLICIT and IMPLICIT counterfactuals, which cross-cut the tripartite 
division of TRUTHIFIERS, FALSIFIERS, and COUNTERPOSSIBLES. It is suggested that this 
understanding can serve as a unified framework to describe Chinese counterfactuals and can also 
be used to accommodate some related optative expressions found in several dialects.  
Key words: counterfactual, conditional, Chinese 
1. On the notion SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
An essential asset of human thinking is its ability to make hypothesis on the basis of known facts 
or imagined situations, and to draw logical conclusions as a result. Hypothetical thinking makes it 
possible for humans to think beyond what is directly observable and contemplate alternative 
contingencies and displaced scenarios. Where such an act of rational thinking is linguistically 
communicated, we observe the use of INDICATIVE and SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS in many Indo-
European languages. The naming of these two types of conditionals reflects the grammatical 
properties of such constructions, more specifically, the verb inflexion in Indo-European languages. 
Indicative conditionals take on verb morphology used for indicative mood, whereas subjunctive 
conditionals take on verbs in a variety of very special forms which are traditionally grouped 
together under the umbrella term SUBJUNCTIVE. This is illustrated here first with examples in 
French: 
(1) Il   mangera     avec nous si nous l’invitons.
He eat-IND-FUT-3rd_ps._sl.   with us     if  we   him-invite-IND-PRES-1st-ps.-pl.
[IND=indicative mood, FUT=future tense, PRES=present tense, ps.= person, sl.=
singular, pl.=plural]
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“He will eat with us if we invite him.” 
(2) Il   mangerait          avec nous  
He eat-COND-PRES-3rd_ps._sl.  with us       
si nous l'invitions. 
if we    him-invite-IND-IMP-1st-ps.-pl. 
[COND=conditional mood(the French conditionnel), IMP=imperfect tense(the 
French imparfait)] 
“He would eat with us if we invited him.” 
(3) Il     aurait     mangé            avec nous 
He  have-COND-PAST-3rd_ps._sl eat-PST_PAR    with  us 
si nous  l'avions      invité. 
if  we    him-have-IND-PAST-PERF-1st-ps.pl. invite-PST_PAR 
[PAST=past tense (passé in French), PERF=perfect aspect, PST_PAR=past 
participle] 
“He would have eaten with us if we had invited him.” 
  
The verb morphology of (1) can be described as INDICATIVE. Such conditionals take the form 
of PRESENT or PRESENT PERFECT(in French, “passé compose”) for PROTASIS (the if-clause, also 
termed THE ANTECEDENT) plus PRESENT, FUTURE, or IMPERATIVE for APODOSIS (the main clause, 
also called THE CONSEQUENT). But the morphology shown in (2) and (3) should be described as 
CONDITIONNEL in French grammar, being in the form of IMPERFECT or PLUPERFECT ( “plus-que-
parfait” in French) for protasis plus CONDITIONAL MOOD or CONDITIONAL PERFECT for the apodosis. 
We should take note of the fact here that the French subjunctive morphology is not used in 
conditional sentences. What is unreal is encoded as CONDITIONNEL in the apodosis, not in protasis. 
Turning now to some examples in English, the morphology in (4) is INDICATIVE, while those in (5) 
and (6), although described as SUBJUNCTIVE in earlier works of English grammar, are now taken 
to be no more than INCONGRUOUS PAST, “incongruous” because THE SIMPLE PAST is used to denote 
THE PRESENT, and THE PAST BEFORE PAST to denote THE SIMPLE PAST for protasis and the 
corresponding PAST MODAL “would” and its PERFECT FORM “would have” for apodosis, thus 
creating a TIME-DISTANCING EFFECT. 
(4) If you arrive on time, you will catch the flight. 
(5) If you arrived on time, you would catch the flight. 
(6) If you had arrived on time, you would have caught the flight. 
So SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS should not be taken as necessarily having the morphological 
property of subjunctive mood, as least not for French and English. Rather, they should be taken 
more from a semantic point of view, as expressing COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING, which is a type 
of conditionals exploring logical implications when the protasis explicitly presents a false situation, 
being either contrary to the fact or relating to some unimaginable, impossible or even contradictory 
scenarios. In contrast, indicative conditionals contain protasis whose truth value is “open”, i.e. 
being either true or false. Through counterfactual hypothesis, one can exercise sophisticated 
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thinking, make bold predictions and give profound judgments, all of which contributing 
significantly both to everyday thinking and to abstract metaphysical and scientific deliberation.1 
 
2. Extrinsic and intrinsic factors  
In propositional calculus, the four basic logical operators  carry purely logical properties in 
the sense that the very formal aspects of these operators determine the truth conditions of the 
compound propositions. Such formal aspects are called EXTRINSIC FACTORS. 2 On the other hand, 
relations such as EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION and NECESSARY CONDITION exhibit INTRINSIC FACTORS 
that are only quasi-logical: the kind of meaning that cannot be ascertained just by examining the 
formal aspects of the formulae but is to be determined by making reference to the content of the 
whole formulae as well as the implicit use-context. (7) is a case of exclusive disjunction and (8) is 
to be interpreted as expressing a necessary condition. 
(7) For the set lunch, you can have either tea or coffee (but not both). 
(8) If you mow the lawn for me, I will pay you fifteen pounds. (= I will pay you only 
if you mow the lawn (if you don’t, I won’t). 
Such intrinsic factors are not un-representable in propositional calculus, but their proper 
representation requires detour treatments, as shown in (9) and (10), which are translations of (7) 
and (8) respectively:  
(9) (P  Q)   (P  Q) [P = One has tea; Q = One has coffee.] 
(10) Q  P  [Q = I pay you fifteen pounds; P = You mow the lawn for me]3 
Linguistic constructions can encode very specific intrinsic factors, such as using “as long as” to 
denote “sufficient condition” and “only if” to denote “necessary condition”. They can also encode 
very general extrinsic factors, such as using “if… then” to denote CONDITIONALITY. In the latter 
case, the conditional is subject to varied interpretations depending on the content it expresses: 
SUFFICIENT or NECESSARY CONDITIONS or even COUNTERFACTUAL in indicative form such as (11) 
and (12), a matter of CONDITIONAL STRENGTHENING in a broad sense. 
(11) If you are the king, then I am the queen. 
(12)  “If he says that two and two are five—well, two and two are five.” [George Orwell: 
Looking Back on the Spanish War] 
But INDICATIVE COUNTERFACTUALS are atypical for English, as most counterfactuals in the 
language are encoded with INCONGRUOUS PAST MORPHOLOGY so that just by examining the 
inflectional forms, they are comprehended as counterfactuals. This is also supposed to be the 
                                                          
1 Cf. Jing-Schmidt (2017), which discusses the significance of counterfactual reasoning from psychological and 
sociological perspectives. 
2 The two notions EXTRINSIC and INTRINSIC FACTORS are credited to William of Ockham in Nickerson (2015) and are 
discussed at length in Sanford (2003).  
3 While (10) is a more accurate representation of the meaning of (8), pragmatic studies have revealed that language 
users often take (8) to mean “P  Q”. That is, their unconscious comprehension habit tends to strengthen the “only 
if” meaning to the “if and only if” meaning.  
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general picture for counterfactual conditionals in other Indo-European languages. But Mandarin 
Chinese and all other Han Chinese dialects seem to defy such a characterization.  What are 
available as morphological features used to encode counterfactual hypothesis in Indo-European 
languages are not found in Chinese, making one wonder whether Chinese has counterfactual 
conditionals as linguistic devices and whether native speakers of Chinese are capable of 
counterfactual thinking at all.  
 
3. Current research issues 
The lack of overt morphological markings for Chinese counterfactuals engenders several important 
issues, even though it has also given rise to an ingrained nonchalance over the topic in the field of 
Chinese grammar in the past century. We look at the few available threads in turn. 
 
3.1 Are native Chinese speakers capable of thinking counterfactually and express such a 
thought in their mother tongue? 
Alfred Bloom raised this question in Bloom (1981, 1984) and concluded through questionnaire 
survey that the Chinese generally found it hard to answer questions that were contrary to fact and 
that the Chinese did not have in their command familiar linguistic means for them to make 
conscious use of, in order to express counterfactual thoughts. Bloom went on further to make a 
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY argument4 based on the assumption that Chinese has no counterfactual 
markers: that the linguistic idiosyncracies of the Chinese language shape the way the Chinese think, 
which is ill-adapted to counterfactual reasoning.  
Bloom’s claims have met with sporadic disagreements since the nineteen eighties. The first 
line of reactions is adopted by some other psychologists. Au (1983, 1984) questioned Bloom’s 
methodology and his stimulus designed, claiming that with improved test questions, Chinese-
speaking subjects perform better in comprehending counterfactual meaning. But neither Bloom 
nor Au provided explanations on how exactly Chinese counterfactuals are encoded, expressed and 
comprehended. They designed some test questions which they felt to be interpretable as 
counterfactuals based on the English counterparts or on their understanding of Chinese, then put 
them to test to see whether the subjects’ reactions would conform to the psychologists’ expectation. 
Subsequent studies carried out by psychologists, such as Liu (1985), Cheng (1985), Wu (1994), 
Yeh and  Gentner (2005), Feng and Yi (2006) and Hsu (2013, 2014), argue more or less against 
Bloom for two different reasons. One group challenge his premise that Chinese has no 
counterfactual markers and provided some other types of evidence to show that counterfactual 
markers do exist in Chinese.5 The other group agree with Bloom largely on his premise but 
challenge his experimental rigor, and then use their own experiments to reach the conclusion that 
even though Chinese has no counterfactual markers, Chinese people can still think counterfactually. 
These two types of views have different implications for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. While 
                                                          
4 Also called the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. 
5 The thesis to be put forward in this paper takes sides with this group, claiming that Bloom’s conclusion is based on 
the misconception that the subjunctive is the only linguistic device of counterfactual marking. 
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neither supports a strong version of the hypothesis, only the latter version is sympathetic to the 
weak version of the relativity hypothesis: that the grammatical structures of a language impact on 
the mode of thinking of the language user to some extent. Chinese linguistics should be thankful 
to psychologists for having initiated research on Chinese counterfactuals and for having made 
important contributions. But it is also worth pointing out that such a study should presuppose an 
informed knowledge of linguistic analysis of the related structures couched in updated linguistic 
theories, which does not seem to be fully exploited in the above-mentioned psychological studies.6  
The second line of reactions in response to Bloom’s proposals is represented by Harbsmeier 
(1998) and Yuan (2015).  In Volume VII:1 of Science and Civilization in China: Language and 
Logic by Christoph Harbsmeier, a sinologist, Chinese counterfactuals are discussed with criticisms 
to Bloom (1981). A subsection titled "Counterfactual conditional sentences" is presented in the 
book (Harbsmeier 1998: 116-118), in which Harbsmeier disagrees with Bloom and points out that 
in classical Chinese, 假使 jiǎshǐ ‘if’ and 若使 ruòshǐ ‘if’, both renderable as ‘if’-like words, always 
mark counterfactual clauses. He also observes that 微 wēi ‘if not’ in Pre-Qin classical Chinese is 
entirely limited to counterfactual usage, claiming that the noun mentioned after “wēi” must refer 
to something that is ‘presupposed to have been non-existent’. The examples he gave were 微夫人
之力…… wēi fū rén zhī lì ‘Without that person’s help’(a nominal expression marked by 之), and 
微夫子之发吾覆也 wēi fū zǐ zhī fā wú fù yě ‘But for the Master’s lifting the veil for me’（a 
nominalized sentence, the marker also being 之）as well as 微太子言 wēi tàizǐ yán ‘Had it not 
been for (you) the Prince’s words…’ (nominal expression with marker 之 omitted). In addition, 
微 wēi ‘if not’ can even come after the nominal subject: 君微出 jūn wēi chū ‘If your highness had 
not left … ’, indicating that “wēi” can also negate the predicate. Here, Harbsmeier seemed to have 
made a mistake. What is presupposed should be some eventuality that is existent, which is referred 
to by the nominal expression or the nominalized event after “wēi” or the event related to the 
predicate negated by “wēi”. For Harbsmeier, the examples he cited suffice to prove that the 
Chinese have been using counterfactuals all the time. But he did not present an exhaustive list of 
available devices to express counterfactuality. In Yuan (2015), a lot more examples in classical 
Chinese are presented, some with dedicated counterfactual lexical markers as special negators or 
as conditional markers, others without, but with counterfactual interpretation inferable from 
contextual information. Since Yuan showed that some classical Chinese examples have 
contextually inferable counterfactual meaning, the dedicated counterfactual markers identified by 
Harbsmeier and Yuan can only be taken as the means to express counterfactual meaning on some 
occasions but not on others, when contextual inference is called for to obtain the counterfactual 
interpretation. Moreover, most of the dedicated markers of counterfactuality identified by 
Harbsmeier and Yuan have become obsolete. What is still in frequent use in ordinary language are 
假使 jiǎshǐ  ‘if’ and 要不是 yàobúshì ‘if-not-be’, the latter being a modern variant of 微 wēi ‘ if 
not’. The case of 假使 jiǎshǐ ‘if’ was also discussed by Y. R. Chao, who remarked that the dozen 
or so ‘if’-like words in Chinese form a gradient from the neutral conditionals to the least possible 
(Chao: 1968): 要是 yàoshì ‘if’ [cognating with 若是 ruòshì ‘if’], 要 yào ‘if’, 假如 jiǎrú ‘if’, 若是
ruòshì ‘if’[如 rú ‘if’ and 若 ruò ‘if’ now used only in the style of classical Chinese], 倘若 tǎngruò 
                                                          
6 Cf. also Jing-Schmidt (2017), which gives critical reviews to many psychology works mentioned here. 
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‘if’, 假若 jiǎruò ‘if’, 假使 jiǎshǐ ‘if’, 倘使 tǎngshǐ ‘if’, 设若 shèruò ‘if’.  Reflecting on Chao’s 
gradient in the present era, of the dozen words listed by Chao, a third of them have become obsolete. 
The remaining ones no longer exhibit any difference in probability in modern Chinese. This point 
was discussed by Jiang (2000), citing Lǚ (1956) in his favour.  
 
3.2 Goals and the topics to be treated here 
The above two lines of approach still leave open the following conjoined questions: how 
exactly counterfactual conditional reasoning is carried out in Chinese and what is the overall 
picture? To answer such questions, more general theories on Chinese counterfactuals need to be 
designed that should meet the following five requirements: 1) clearly state how counterfactual 
conditionals are phrased in Mandarin Chinese, 2) nicely accommodate some important claims 
about explicit and implicit counterfactuals in Chinese in the works extant, 3) identify the types of 
counterfactual conditionals and the use conditions of each, 4) provide a framework to describe 
some special constructions found in Han dialects/languages other than Mandarin, especially the 
optative constructions, and 5) reveal similarities and real differences between the counterfactual 
constructions in Han languages and some more inflection-reliant languages.  The remaining 
sections of this paper take close looks at the data, but the findings are also used to introduce and 
refine a unified descriptive framework that makes some initial attempts at attaining the above five 
goals. It embodies a continuation from the position held by the first group of psychological studies 
reviewed above, maintaining that Chinese does have linguistic means to reach counterfactuality, 
but with a unified approach, claiming that there is a continuum in Chinese counterfactual marking 
from overt dedicated marker 要不是 yàobúshì ‘if-not-be’ to covert structural as well as diffuse 
lexical features. It then explicates a recent proposal that Chinese counterfactuals can be formally 
EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT, the two notions cross-cutting the tripartite division of TRUTHIFIERS, 
FALSIFIERS, and COUNTERPOSSIBLES. The typical explicit counterfactual in Mandarin is headed by 
the falsifier 要不是 yàobúshì ‘if-not-be’, which should best be treated as a unary operator prefixing 
a veridical P, making the resulting construction categorically different from the lexically similar 
要不然 yàobúrán ‘if-not-so’ or the more usual antecedent negation. Also discussed are some other 
constructions in Mandarin and in Wu dialects that are explicitly counterfactual, especially the 
truthifying 蛮好 meho ‘be-good-that’ construction in Shanghainese. The next topic concerns ways 
through which counterfactual meaning is reached via the use of a set of weak features in unmarked 
conditionals, whose real function is to pragmatically effect a change that will TRUTHIFY or FALSIFY 
a contingent situation rather than expressing counterfactuality directly.7 Substitution tests will be 
provided to demonstrate the subtle working of the weak features, including the perfective aspectual 
marker 了-le, the antecedent 早 zǎo ‘early’ and the consequent 早 zǎo ‘early’, the truthifying 
enhancer 真的 zhēnde ‘really’ and negation as the default falsifier. The final topic is about the 
COUNTERPOSSIBLES, including the COUNTER-IDENTICALS, showing that this type of counterfactuals 
makes no use of weak features in Chinese, just like similar cases in English that do not make use 
of FAKE-TENSE MORPHOLOGY. 
 
                                                          
7 Both TRUTHIFY and FALSIFY are borrowed from Rescher (2007).  
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3.3 The case of “yàobúshì” 
The considerations given in Section 3.1 leave 要不是 yàobúshì ‘if-not-be’ to be the only extant 
“if”-expression in modern Mandarin that is dedicatedly marked for counterfactual conditionals. 
Relevant examples are given as (13) – (15).  
(13) yàobúshì wǒ yìng      xià    yītiáo    xīn ， gēnběn jiù      cí        bú  liǎo  zhí ，  
if-not-be  I     harden down one-CL heart, at-all    hence resign not ASP post 
gèng lái     bú  liǎo   Běijīng 
also  come not ASP Beijing 
[CL = classifier; ASP = aspect marker] 
要不是我硬下一条心，根本就辞不了职，更来不了北京。 
“Had I not made up my mind, I would not have been able to resign at all, nor would 
I have been able to come to Beijing. ”  
(14) yàobúshì Hǎo Hǎidōng  nà    yǒudiǎn yùnqì          de       jìnqiú ,  
if-not-be  Hao  Haidong that  rather     luck         DE1    goal 
píngjú kěndìng  huì  zhāo-lái bùmǎn              hé      fēiyì  
draw   certainly will cause     dissatisfaction  and    criticism 
[DE1 = modifier/possessive marker]  
要不是郝海东那有点运气的进球,平局肯定会招来不满和非议。 
“Had it not been for Hao Haidong to score that rather lucky goal, a tie would surely 
have incurred dissatisfaction and complaints.” 
(15) yàobúshì zhǔchírén dǎduàn,     hěn   nán    shuō gǔzhǎng   néng  
if-not-be  host           interrupt   very  hard   tell   applause   can 
chíxù dào shēnme shíhòu  
last     to   what      time 
要不是主持人打断,很难说鼓掌能持续到什么时候。 
“Had it not been for the ceremony presenter who put the cheers to an end, it would 
have been hard to tell how long the applause would last.” 
 
  “yàobúshì” is very different from 要是……不 yàoshì…bú ‘if … not’ or 要……不是
yào…búshì ‘if … not-be’: the latter two bring about the negation of a proposition in the usual 
sense, yielding a protasis ambivalent between a counterfactual reading and an indicative reading, 
whereas the former one not only negates a proposition, but “closes it off” so that the whole protasis 
has only the dedicated counterfactual reading. Here, negation obviously plays a vital role, but 
negation is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. In the “yàoshì…bú” construction, 
which also forms a protasis, negation is also present, but the resulting protasis does not have to be 
contrary to fact.  “yàobúshì” is to be viewed as a grammaticalized chunk also because as a chunk, 
it has a flexible distribution just like an “if” word, either prefixing the ensuing protasis or plugged 
in between the subject and the predicate of the protasis clause.  
Yan JIANG, Department of Linguistics, SOAS, University of London 
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An interesting observation can be made on the distinction between 要不是 yàobúshì ‘if-not-
be’  and 要不然 yàobúrán ‘if-not-so’ .8 In terms of morphological structure, these two chunks form 
a minimal pair. But in terms of usage, "yàobúrán" is a protasis containing a fusion of [if + not + 
discourse deixis (referring to a contextually salient situation)]. Thus "yàobúrán" acts as the protasis 
and is followed by a proposition serving as the apodosis. The resulting conditional is an indicative 
one, never a counterfactual one. No ambiguity between the factual and the counterfactual is 
detected. 
If we take the role of the “yàobúshì” chunk as taking in a necessarily true proposition as its 
argument and returning a counterfactual protasis, it is tentamount to saying that the whole protasis 
is also a fusion of “yàobúshì” and the ensuing proposition, which is likely to reopen the old debate 
on whether the “if” word is a BINARY OPERATOR or a UNARY OPERATOR. The debate concerns the 
mapping between logical operators and natural language expressions. In propositional logic, the 
arrow operator  denotes conditionality and is a two-place infix operator or a binary operator for 
short, taking in the protasis and the apodosis as its two arguments. Then the “if”-word could be 
taken as a binary term as well, representable as IF (P, Q). Some logicians argue for a unary analysis 
of IF, taking it to combine with the protasis only, but the unary analysis is a lone voice. 9 Yet in 
the case of “yàobúshì”, “yào” is fused with “búshì” to make it different from the usual “if … not…, 
Q ” construction, but “búshì” still takes the protasis P in its scope and exerts negation force over 
it, making “yàobúshì” behave more like a unary operator, with only the protasis as its argument. 
Then the structure of the whole conditional should be taken as [ [“yàobúshì” P], Q], contrasting 
markedly with the indicative counterpart, which has the structure [“yàoshì” [P, Q]].  
Hsu (2013, 2014) report psycholinguistic experimental studies on Chinese counterfactual 
reasoning. Based on findings from her study on the use of “yàobúshì”, Hsu concluded that “… 
counterfactual reasoning was accessible without contextual cues in Chinese” and thought her study 
“challenged the traditional view that counterfactual thinking is exclusively available through 
discourse in conversational Chinese due to the lack of a subjunctive mood”. Hsu’s alleged 
challenge does not seem to hold water. Works on Chinese conditionals published before Hsu’s 
works, if they discussed the issue of counterfactuality at all, have noticed the availability of 
“yàobúshì” and its equivalents in classical Chinese as dedicated counterfactual markers.10 But they 
have also taken note of the fact that, while counterfactual reasoning is indeed accessible without 
contextual cues in Chinese when “yàobúshì” is used, there could be many other ways to express 
counterfactual thinking which make no use of “yàobúshì”. It is those counterfactual uses which 
lack explicit markers, in contrast to “yàobúshì”, that have been identified as carrying 
counterfactual meaning and comprehensible as such through discourse in conversation.  
One swallow doesn’t make a summer. Native speakers of Mandarin would readily agree that 
not all counterfactual thinking are expressed through “yàobúshì” construction. Many more are in 
fact expressed as implicit counterfactuals which will be looked at in the next section, not as explicit 
                                                          
8 This is arguably the first time the distinction is drawn, as the two chunks have never been viewed as a minimal pair 
before. 
9 Cf. Bennett 2003 and his citation of Victor Dudman’s works. 
10 Cf. Chen (1988) and Jiang (2000). 
Penultimate version, July 2017 
 
 
 
counterfactuals headed by “yàobúshì”. Moreover, probably not many native speakers have realized 
that “yàobúshì” imposes a stringent constraint on the content of the protasis proposition. That is, 
some counterfactual ideas are ineffable with “yàobúshì” without rearrangements.  As an 
experiment, try to translate into Chinese Blaise Pascal’s famous remark, “If Cleopatra’s nose had 
been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been changed.”11  A colloquial rendering 
would take the form of (16), which involves extensive rearrangements to make the protasis fit into 
the metalevel prefix “yàobúshì”. (17) appears to be nearer to the English counterpart, but has to 
take on an extra layer of negation so as to match the negative meaning of the if-not-be prefix. As 
another experiment, think how hard it would be to interpret a “yàobúshì” protasis containing a 
double negation, as shown in (18). A check at Beijing University Modern Chinese Corpus revealed 
that no double negation was found to follow “yàobúshì”, even though single negation can 
occasionally be found, as shown in (19). This finding indicates that “yàobúshì” cannot 
accommodate multiple negation. The last point is that what follow “yàobúshì” seem to be rather 
down-to-earth, contingent events or states, and no abstract thoughts can be prefixed by it. 12  
Consequently, other means to reach counterfactuality, if at all available, will have to be employed 
for abstract counterfactuals, which may also be usable for more worldly counterfactuals. 
(16) yàobúshì āijí    yànhòu           de      bízi    nàme tǐngbá    xiùlì ， 
if-not-be Egypt beauty-queen  DE1  nose   that    straight pretty 
shìjiè   lìshǐ        jiù        huì   shì lìng     yīfān     miànmào le  
world   history   hence   will  be  other   one-CL look         SFM 
要不是埃及艳后的鼻子那么挺拔秀丽，世界历史就会是另一番面貌了。 
[SFM = sentence final marker] 
“If-not-be the Egyptian Queen’s nose [be] so straight [and] pretty, world history 
would be of a different situation.” 
(17) yàobúshì āijí      yànhòu            de      bízǐ    méi         zhǎng dé      duǎn  diǎn-ér ， 
if-not-be Egypt  beauty-queen  DE1  nose   not-PEF  grow   DE2  short  a-bit 
                                                          
11 In its French original: Le nez de Cléopâtre, s’il eut été plus court, toute la face de la terre aurait changé. 
12 On this last point that no abstract thoughts can be prefixed by “yàobúshì”, a familiar example can be examined, 
which was used by Bloom (1981) as a test question: 
  
(i) jiǎrú suǒyǒu de  yuánquān dōu hěn   dà ， 
if      all         DE1       circle        all   very big 
rúguǒ zhègè     xiǎo    sānjiǎoxíng “” shì yīgè        yuánquān ， 
if     this-CL  small   triangle  be  one-CL  circle 
nàme zhègè     sānjiǎoxíng shì  bú   shì hěn   dà ？ 
then   this-CL  triangle       be   not  be  very big 
假如所有的圆圈都很大，如果这个小三角形“”是一个圆圈，那么这个三角形是不是很大？ 
a.  “If all circles were large and this small triangle ‘’ were a circle, would it be large?” 
b. “If all circles are large and this small triangle ‘’ is a circle, will it be large?” 
(i) is an example containing a series of propositions that are abstract in content. The example takes on the form 
of “jiǎrú P, rúguǒ Q, nàme R” (roughly equivalent to “If P, if Q, then R”), which can be comprehended either as an 
open conditional or as a counterfactual one – nothing in form marks it as counterfactual. But there is no natural way 
to rephrase the example with a prefix “yàobúshì”. The difficulty remains the same even if either of the two protases 
is removed. 
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shìjiè  lìshǐ      jiù       huí    shì  lìng    yīfān     miànmào le  
world history  hence  will   be   other  one-CL look         SFM 
[PEF = perfective; DE2 = result marker] 
要不是埃及艳后的鼻子没长得短点儿，世界历史就会是另一番面貌了。 
 “If-not-be the Egyptian Queen’s nose not grow shorter, world history would be of 
a different situation.” 
(18) ? yàobúshì wǒ niánqīng shí     méi         dǎsuàn  bú   shàngxué ， 
   if-not-be   I    young     time  not-PEF  intend   not  go-to-school 
xiànzài nǎ      huì  zài dàxué         dāng jiāoshī    ne  
now      how  can  at   university  do      teacher   Q 
[Q = question marker] 
要不是我年轻时没打算不上学，现在哪会在大学当教师呢？ 
“Had it not been the case that I didn’t intend not to go to school when I was young, 
how could I have become a university teacher now?” 
(19) yàobúshì   tā    qiāngfǎ            bú    zhǔn , 
if-not-be    he   shooting-skill  not  accurate 
zǐdàn    shāoshāo piānlí    le      xīnzàng , 
bullet    a little     deviate ASP  heart 
tā   zǎo    yīmìngwūhū le  
he  early  die                ASP 
要不是他枪法不准,子弹稍稍偏离了心脏,他早一命呜呼了。 
“If-not-be he1 had not aimed accurately and the bullet had missed the heart, he2 
would have kicked the bucket in no time.” 
 
3.4. Implicit counterfactuals and weak features 
Given that “yàobúshì” does not provide the only route to reach counterfactuality in 
Mandarin, the only other available route seems to be to use unmarked conditionals to express either 
indicative or counterfactuals and let the context provide pragmatic cues to facilitate the 
comprehender’s meaning-construction. However, current studies have revealed a third route: cues 
can also be provided by a cluster of unnoticeable weak features or lexical items that contribute, 
sometimes jointly, to the reach of counterfactual meaning.13  It has been found that the use of the 
following can contribute to counterfactual meaning:   the aspectual suffix 了 1 le1 ‘optional marker 
of perfective aspect’, the sentence final marker 了 2 le2 ‘denoting the change of state or emergence 
of a situation’, the temporal adverb 早 zǎo ‘early’ either in protasis or in apodosis, the negation 
words such as 不 bú” ‘not’ and 没 méi ‘not-PEF’, and the emphatic adverb 真的 zhēnde ‘really’ . 
(20) yàoshì nǐ    qù le，     jiù       bú   huì  bú  zhùyì   tā  nà   piàoliàng de     tàitài de 
      if         you go ASP,  hence  not  will not notice  he that pretty       DE1 wife  AM 
 [AM = assertion marker] 
                                                          
13 Cf. Chen (1988), Jiang (2000), Wang (2013), Yuan (2015) and Yong (2016). 
Penultimate version, July 2017 
 
  
要是你去了，就不会不注意他那漂亮的太太的。 
“If you had been there, you would not have failed to notice his pretty wife.” 
(21) rúguǒ wǒ  zǎo     zhīdào tā  bù  lái ，   wǒ yě     bú   huì  lái      le 
if        I     early   know   he not come, I     also  not  will come SFM 
如果我早知道他不来，我也不会来了。 
“If I knew it earlier that he would not come, I would not come either.” 
(22) yàoshì tā  kěn     tuō rén            shuō  yījù         hǎo    huà ， 
if         he agree  ask someone   say    one-CL   good  word 
wǒ zǎo    jiù       gěi nàjiā      gōngsī  lùyòng le 
I     early hence  by  that-CL  firm     hire      SFM 
要是他肯托人说一句好话，我早就给那家公司录用了。 
“If he was willing to put in a good word for me through some contacts, I would 
have been hired by that company.” 
(23) yàoshì wǒ zhēnde zhòng le       liùhécǎi，  nà    wǒ mǎshàng       jiù      huì  cízhí 
if         I     really   hit       ASP  Mark-Six,  then I    immediately hence will resign 
要是我真的中了六合彩，那我马上就会辞职。 
“If I really won the Mark Six, I would quit my work immediately.” 
(24) yàoshì gāngcái     nàgè      rènyìqiú   méi         fá-jìn， 
if         just-now   that-CL freekick    not-PEF  shoot-in,  
jiù       huì   tī      jiāshísài                  le 
hence  will kick  extra-time-match    SFM 
要是刚才那个任意球没罚进，就会踢加时赛了。 
“If that free-kick had not been in, the match would have gone into extra-time.” 
 While several weak features have been repeatedly identified in the literature as contributing 
to counterfactual meaning, the exact function of each is not at all clear in this context. Some highly 
tentative thoughts are presented here in anticipation of more cogent explanations. 了 1 le1  marks 
the occurrence of an event or change of a state which, if mentioned as a hypothetical one, can serve 
as a contrast to the reality. Likewise, if the initiation of a new situation by the sentence-final marker 
了 2 le2 does not match the real-world scenario, a what-if-otherwise implicature is conveyed. 早
zǎo ‘early’ in the protasis points vaguely to some time earlier than the reference time, to which a 
hypothetical event can be hooked, whereas 早 zǎo ‘early’ in the apodosis conveys a modal meaning 
of volitional judgment, sometimes also showing the speaker’s regret or disbelief, thereby giving 
the apodosis an optative reading.  
Both “le1”, “le2” and “zǎo” are reminiscent of the temporal-distancing effect in counterfactual 
conditionals of English and other Indo-European languages, where past morphology is used to 
depict a counterfactual present, and the past before past is used to depict a counterfactual past. 真
的 zhēnde ‘really’, when used in a protasis, always implicates that reality is to the contrary – that 
the eventuality modified by “zhēnde” does not really happen.  Finally negation, though not a 
dedicated counterfactual marker as “yàobúshì”, can easily provide an alternative scenario which, 
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in proper contexts, could be taken as contrary-to-fact, especially when it takes on the perfective 
form 没“méi”. The following set of sentences show minimal differences that are worthy of scrutiny. 
 
(25)  yàoshì  zhègè   rènyìqiú   fá-jìn     le ， 
 if  this-CL freekick   kick-in  SFM 
 jiù        huì   tī      jiāshísài                le  
hence   will kick extra-time-match  SFM 
要是这个任意球罚进了，就会踢加时赛了。 
a. “If this free-kick is in, the match will go into extra time.” 
b.“If this free-kick were in, the match would go into extra time.” 
(26)  yàoshì zhègè     rènyìqiú  fá-bú-jìn ， 
 if  this-CL freekick   shoot-not-in 
 jiù        huì  tī      jiāshísài                le  
hence  will kick extra-time-match  SFM 
要是这个任意球罚不进，就会踢加时赛了。 
a. “If this free-kick is not in, the match will go into extra time.” 
b.“If this free-kick were not in, the match will go into extra time.” 
(27)  yàoshì zhègè     rènyìqiú méi         fá-jìn ， 
 if  this-CL freekick  not-PEF  shoot-in 
 jiù        huì  tī      jiāshísài                le  
hence  will kick extra-time-match  SFM 
要是这个任意球没罚进，就会踢加时赛了。 
a. “If this free-kick were not in, the match would go into extra time.” 
b.“If this free-kick is not in, the match will go into extra time.” 
(28) yàoshì  nàgè      rènyìqiú fá-jìn       le ， 
   if that-CL freekick  shoot-in  SFM 
jiù       huì   tī      jiāshísài           le  
hence  will kick  extra-time-match  SFM 
要是那个任意球罚进了，就会踢加时赛了。 
“If that free-kick had been in, the match would have gone into extra time.” 
(29) yàoshì  zhègè     rènyìqiú zhēnde fá-jìnqù        le ， 
if  this-CL freekick  really   shoot-go-in  SFM 
 jiù       huì tī      jiāshísài                 le  
hence  will kick extra-time-match  SFM 
要是这个任意球真的罚进去了，就会踢加时赛了。 
“If this free-kick were really in, the match would go into extra time.” 
(30) yàoshì  nàgè       rènyìqiú zhēnde fá-jìnqù        le ， 
if  that-CL freekick  really   shoot-go-in  SFM 
jiù        huì tī      jiāshísài                 le 。 
hence  will kick extra-time-match  SFM 
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要是那个任意球真的罚进去了，就会踢加时赛了。 
“If that free-kick were really in, the match would go into extra time.” 
(31) yàoshì   nàgè      rènyìqiú zhēnde fá-jìnqù        le ， 
if  that-CL freekick  really   shoot-go-in  SFM 
bǐsài    zǎo    jiù       jiéshù le ， 
match  early hence  end     SFM 
hái   tī       shíme jiāshísài ！ 
and  kick   what  extra-time-match 
要是那个任意球真的罚进去了，比赛早就结束了，还踢什么加时赛！ 
“If that free-kick were really in, the match would be over already. What extra time 
match needs to be played!” 
(32) yàoshì zǎo    fá-jìn      nàgè      rènyìqiú ， 
if         early shoot-in  that-CL freekick 
bǐsài    jiù      jiéshù  le ， 
match hence  end     SFM 
hái   tī        shíme jiāshísài ！ 
and  kick    what  extra-time-match 
要是早罚进那个任意球，比赛就结束了，还踢什么加时赛！ 
“If that free-kick were in in good time, the match would be over. What extra time 
match needs to be played!” 
 
(25) can be interpreted as either an indicative conditional or a counterfactual one. When using the 
proximal demonstrative “this free-kick”, the situation under discussion is right in front of the eyes. 
It could be just over, giving rise to a counterfactual reading, or is just about to begin, making the 
sentence an open conditional. The presence of “le” here is not decisive enough to produce a 
counterfactual reading. (26) and (27) each have binary readings for the same reason. (27) also 
reveals the fact that “méi” had better be characterized as “perfective negation”, not as “past 
negation”, as it may be used to describe an event about to happen. (28) differs from (25) in using 
the distal demonstrative “that free-kick” instead of “this”, which refers to the situation under 
discussion as a past and alternative event. Then ‘le’ contributes to the alternation of the event, 
leading to a counterfactual reading. (29) and (30) contain both “le” and “zhēnde”, turning the 
conditionals into counterfactuals. (31) shares with (30) the same protasis. Yet (31) adds a “zǎo” to 
its apodosis. Counterfactual reading becomes prominent as a result. Lastly, (32) contains a “zǎo” 
in its protasis, thereby giving the sentence a counterfactual reading.  
While weak features independently or in varied combinations contribute to the reach of 
counterfactuality, none poses a sufficient nor necessary condition, hence the name. Although 
sophisticated accounts could be given to explain the subtle working of these features, one 
undeniable fact is that these features are all dispensable, and counterfactuality can still be reached 
without the presence of any. The presence of “le” here is worth more discussion. Although “le” 
serves the more usual roles of aspectual marker and sentence-final marker in many sentences, here, 
what is at issue is the special case of using “le” to create a contrast between two propositions with 
Yan JIANG, Department of Linguistics, SOAS, University of London 
 
14 
 
and without “le”.  The proposition containing “le” can carry a counterfactual flavour because 
protasis in indicative conditionals is assumed to express an irrealis proposition, but the introduction 
of “le” forces the proposition to take on a realis form. “zǎo” and “zhēnde” can create similar effects 
individually. Thus a non-occurring situation is pretended to have taken place, which is what 
counterfactuals set out to express, and the co-occurrence of two or more such weak features will 
strengthen the counterfactual effects 
 
4. Towards a unified description of Chinese counterfactuals 
Discussions in the sections above leave a rather fragmentary picture of Chinese counterfactuals 
that can hardly give a clear answer to the question that was raised at the beginning: how is 
counterfactual reasoning expressed in Chinese? In some recent works of mine, some initial 
attempts have been made to design a unified descriptive framework for Chinese counterfactuals 
(Jiang 2014; 2016). The thesis therein is carried over to the present discussion as a line of thinking 
worthy of explication and expansion. In Jiang (2014; 1016), I take note of the fact that “yàobúshì”-
counterfactuals in Mandarin have some parallel expressions both in Mandarin and in other dialects, 
expressing counterfactual meaning with conditional sentences or with optative constructions: 
(33) cóngqián   yǒu      yīgè       rén       chī shāobǐng， 
once-upon-a-time there-be   one-CL person  eat  cake 
dìyīgè     shāobǐng méiyǒu         chī bǎo， 
 first-CL  cake        not-PEF-be   eat full 
zài      mǎi dìèrgè,         zhídào zuìhòu dìsāngè   luòdù   cái   bǎo le, 
 Again buy second-CL  until     finally third-CL take-in then full SFM 
nàrén   kāishǐ hòuhuǐ qǐlái， 
 that-person begin regret IM 
shuō： zǎo    zhīdào dìsāngè    shāobǐng bǎo dùzǐ， 
 say early  know   third-CL  cake       fill  stomach 
hébì huāqián           chī  qiánmiàn liǎnggè [Mandarin] 
why spend-money  eat  previous   two-CL 
[IM = inchoative marker] 
从前有一个人吃烧饼。第一个烧饼没有吃饱，再买第二个。直到最后第三个落
肚才饱了。那人开始后悔起来，说：“早知道第三个烧饼饱肚子，何必花钱吃
前面两个？” 
“Once upon a time, there was a man eating sesame-seed cakes.  Having taken one, 
he was still hungry. So he bought another one, and the third. Then he was full but 
started to regret, ‘Had I known the third one would make me full, I wouldn’t have 
spent money on the first two!’ ” 
(34) zhèchǎng huǒ，  xìngkuī xiāofángduì lái       dé       zǎo,  
zhis-CL   fire     lucky     fire-brigade  come  DE2   early 
fǒuzé         hòuguǒ     bùkān           shèxiǎng    [Mandarin] 
otherwise   outcome   not-endure   imagination 
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这场火，幸亏消防队来得早。否则后果不堪设想。 
“This fire, lucky was it that firemen arrived in good time [to put it out]. Otherwise, 
it would have caused unimaginable damages.” 
(35) Mehau  ganggang cen ditik  qi nao !14  
much-preferred just-now take underground go EM-SFP  
蛮好刚刚乘地铁启孬！    [Shanghai Wu dialect] 
(EM-SFP = emotive sentence-final particle ) 
“It would have been much better that we took the underground at the time. ” 
Mandarin equivalent : 刚才要是坐地铁去就好了。 
(36)  Mengji-le zaudi mafang  be 
 forget-ASP earlier buy-house SFP 
猛记了早地马房把。  [Zhejiang Longyou 龙游 Wu dialect]15 
“Should have bought a property earlier. ” 
Mandarin equivalent : 早点买了房就好了 
(37)  zǎo    xiǎodé nǐ    lái      shíjià ，wǒ hái   yòng áojīngfèilì              lei ？16 
 early know   you come  CM       I    still  need  make-great-effort  SFM 
[CM = counterfactual marker] 
早晓得你来时价，我还用熬精费力嘞？[Shaanxi 陕西 Shenmu 神木 dialect] 
“If I were to know you would come, I wouldn’t exhaust myself on the work.” 
(38) zhèjiān fáng    zài   dà diǎn-ér shíjià 
this-CL room  still big a-bit     CM 
这间房再大点儿时价。   [Shaanxi 陕西 Shenmu 神木 dialect.] 
“If only the room were larger.” 
 
(33) is a conditional in disguise. The “if”-word is omitted, and the fixed expression 早知
道 zǎo zhīdào ‘know earlier’ takes on a veridical proposition and yields a counterfactual hypothesis. 
In (34), 幸亏 xìngkuī ‘It is lucky that …’ also takes on a veridical proposition, but it does not yield 
a counterfactual statement per se. Instead, it can often be followed by another routine statement: 
不然的话 búrán de huà/ 否则 fǒuzé ‘otherwise’, which is a shorthand protasis and is a negation 
of the aforementioned veridical statement, pointing to the counterfactual opposite.  On the other 
hand, (35) – (38) each contains a lexicalized device which takes in an antiveridical proposition and 
yields a counterfactual statement. These structures are few in number, but each is very familiar 
and frequently used in its own Chinese variant. And there may be many other dialects of Chinese 
which contain such fixed patterns of counterfactuality that remain to be identified and included in 
                                                          
14 More in Jiang & Wang (2016). As tone sandhi in Shanghainese is very complicated, it is customary for non-phonetic 
studies to omit tones in example sentences. Example (35) is from daily conversations taken down by the author as a 
native speaker of the Shanghai Wu language. 
15 Example collected in author’s fieldwork taking recorded sound files. For (36)-(37), Romanization only reflects 
approximate pronunciation. Characters are also given in an attempt to mimic dialectal pronunciation. 
16 Example (37)-(38) taken from Xing (2002: 636-7). Romanization is based on the pronunciation in Mandarin and 
does not reflect the pronunciation in Shenmu dialect. According to Xing, 时价 ‘shijia’ should be pronounced as 
and is a dedicated subjunctive marker. 
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this inventory. These patterns invariably treat contingent worldly matters, hence the requirements 
on veridicality or antiveridicality can be readily met and verified. As a theoretical extension, in 
Jiang (2016), I adopt the criteria used by Rescher, who divides HISTORICAL COUNTERFACTUALS17 
into TRUTHIFYING and FALSIFYING ones (Rescher 2007). By definition, truthifying counterfactuals 
denote cases when something-or-other—which did not actually happen—had happened. Then 
certain specifiable consequences would have ensued. On the other hand, falsifying counterfactuals 
denote cases when something-or-other—which actually did happen — had not happened. Then 
again, certain specifiable consequences would have ensued. In this light, Chinese explicit 
counterfactuals are of the same nature as historical counterfactuals, being classifiable into 
truthifying and falsifying ones. More importantly, the counterfactual markers are encoded means 
to truthify or falsify related propositions, yielding counterfactual statements. Given that explicit 
counterfactuals in Chinese are all real-life contingent, it can also be hypothesized that the implicit 
counterfactuals are real-life dependent as well, and are also classifiable into truthifying and 
falsifying ones. The weak features previously identified do not contribute directly to counterfactual 
meaning. Instead, they provide cues to help falsify or truthify the protasis proposition depending 
on the contribution made by the lexical items. 没有 méiyǒu ‘negation-perfective’ and 真的 zhēnde 
‘really’ can now be viewed as typical falsifier and truthifier respectively. Even a totally unmarked 
conditional can also have falsifying or truthifying counterfactual readings, when the language user 
checks the veridicality and contingency of the protasis content against the topics right “in front of 
his eyes”.   
Does it make much sense to talk about FALSIFYING and TRUTHIFYING COUNTERFACTUALS 
in English in general, not just as HISTORICAL COUNTERFACTUALS? For languages with 
morphologically marked counterfactuals, it is probably less significant, and it also depends on 
whether a language has frozen falsifying and truthifying constructions. On the other hand, Chinese 
lacks explicit counterfactual morphology but makes abundant use of frozen falsifying frames and 
truthifying constructions, which can all be re-analyzed as hidden conditionals. 
It is important to reiterate that both truthifying and falsifying apply to the domain of 
counterfactual statements or hypotheses and should not be confused with the meaning and use of 
indicative conditionals. 
 
5. Counterpossibles and a related puzzle 
This discussion is not complete without talking about the counterpossible conditionals, which get 
counterfactual readings because they have counter-possible protases, cf. Krakauer (2012). They 
are neither falsifying nor truthifying, since they do not point to a past or immediate contingency. 
They are counterfactual purely by content:18 
 
                                                          
17 HISTORICAL COUNTERFACTUALS are a kind of counterfactual conditionals used to hypothesize alternatives in past 
history, either as an entertainment or as a serious effort in historiographical studies. Such counterfactuals are similar 
to the counterfactuals about ordinary life occasions in that they both hypothesize on alternatives to irrevocable past 
events. Cf. Ferguson (1997) and Evans (2014) for details, in addition to an introduction in Wikipedia under 
“Counterfactual History”.  
18 (39) is also called a COUNTER-IDENTICAL by Nickerson (2015). 
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(39) yàoshì  huàn     le      wǒ dehuà ， 
if change ASP  I     CDM 
jiù        bú   huì   duì tā      zhème kèqì   le  
hence   not  will to    him  so        polite SFM 
[CDM=conditional protasis marker] 
要是换了我的话，就不会对他这么客气了。 
“If I were to deal with the case, I would not be so nice to him.” 
(40) rúguǒ  tàiyáng cóng xībiān chūlái ， 
if sun  from west    come-out 
wǒ yīdìng  jià  gěi nǐ 
I     certainly marry to   you 
如果太阳从西边出来，我一定嫁给你。 
“If the sun comes out from the West, I will be your wife for sure.” 
(41) yàoshì  tā shuō èr     jiā   èr    děngyú wǔ —  
if he say   two plus two equal    five 
nàme hǎode ，èr     jiā    èr    jiù      děngyú wǔ  
then   fine two  plus two hence equal     five 
要是他说二加二等于五 — 那么好的，二加二就等于五。 
“If he says that two and two are five—well, two and two are five.” [George 
Orwell: Looking Back on the Spanish War] 
(42) jiǎrú wǒ yǒu    yīshuāng   chìbǎng ， 
if      I     have one-pair     wing 
wǒ xiǎng xiàng xiǎoniǎo   yīyàng zìyóu de     fēixiáng  
I     wish  like    little-bird same    free    DE3 fly 
[DE3 = adverbial modification marker] 
假如我有一双翅膀，我想像小鸟一样自由地飞翔。 
“If I had a pair of wings, I wish to fly freely like a little bird.” 
 It is worth noting that the above sentences do not contain the explicit or implicit truthyfying 
or falsifying features. It is customary not to add such features, even though it is not impossible to 
add a feature or two of this kind. For example, adding 真的 zhēnde ‘really’ to (40) and (42) will 
also do, but not for (39) and (41). On the other hand, adding 早 zǎo ‘early’ to any of the above 
examples is not acceptable. Nor is it at all possible to add 要不是 yàobúshì ‘if-not-be’ or 早知道
zǎo zhīdào ‘know earlier’. Note also that equivalents in English, as shown by (11) – (12), also 
show like features. They are counterfactuals without special morphological markers.  
 But that is still not the whole story, as there is another type of English counterfactuals that 
assume the form of indicatives. In live football commentary, one can often catch comments like 
“if the ball goes in, we go into extra time” or “if the ball goes in, we’re looking at (another half an 
hour of) extra time”, when the ball has in fact just been missed.19  Obviously, this is not a 
                                                          
19 I thank Bjarke Frellesvig for pointing this case out to me and I thank an anonymous reviewer for supplying the two 
authentic examples given here.  
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counterpossible but it also takes on the form of indicative or bare counterfactual. The football 
commentary case presented here bears much resemblance to the Chinese equivalent given as (25), 
which is also bare but is ambiguous between the indicative and the counterfactual readings. There 
is perhaps a cognitive reason for such uses, for both the languages. Counterfactual reasoning is 
after all a complicated thinking process requiring investment in cognitive effort. For an event that 
has just happened, one has two choices. Either he stands back and contemplates the event (taking 
a sip of coffee), then makes the comment – in the form of a subjunctive conditional. Or more 
commonly, he lets out his comment without much thinking – in the form of an indicative 
counterfactual, simply because he has no time to adjust, or he is watching the playback. 
 
6. Epilogue 
Studies of counterfactual conditionals have accumulated a vast literature, boasting some of the 
most stimulating achievements in philosophy and linguistics. But the study of Chinese 
counterfactuals remains to be a road less trodden, calling for more studies in all directions, so that 
more findings can be achieved and more consensus, reached. This paper proposes a unified 
descriptive framework of Chinese counterfactuals, which is tilted toward logico-semantic and 
inferential-pragmatic approaches. Two other recent works have provided general theoretical 
characterizations of Chinese counterfactuals. One is Yuan (2015), which provides broadly 
cognitive and cultural generalizations. The other is Jing-Schmidt (2017), which provides a broadly 
functional and pragmatic analysis in construction grammar.  
This paper can be viewed as an exercise in SEMANTIC BOTANY, which is taken to precede any 
attempts at formalization and theorization, as it is necessary to establish first some minimal 
common ground on this much neglected and rather controversial topic in Chinese linguistics. 
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